Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: October 2025

Argentina: Milei faces electoral defeat and growing street pressure amid corruption allegations

On 7 September, President Javier Milei’s party lost by a landslide in the Buenos Aires provincial elections to the left-leaning Peronist opposition, which obtained 47% of the votes. The main drivers of this outcome were the economic slowdown the country has been experiencing over the past few months and the leaked audio in which a former government official accused Milei’s sister and main adviser, Karina Milei, of receiving bribes linked to the purchase of medicines for people with disabilities.¹ Markets reacted negatively to the loss, forcing the Central Bank to sell more than 1 billion US dollars of reserves to defend the country’s peso, leading the US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to pledge a $20 billion swap line to support the country’s liquidity.²

Growing discontent over Milei’s policies also manifested in street protests. In September, ACLED records more than 60 peaceful protests in 20 different provinces against the president’s vetoes of the Pediatric Emergency, Disability Emergency, and University Funding laws. These protests contributed to around a 40% increase in demonstrations compared to the previous month and may have prompted the national congress to reverse the president’s veto on the Disability Emergency Law. This is the first reverse of this kind since Milei took office in December 2023.³ As the 26 October legislative elections approach, US support may not be enough for Milei to avoid another electoral defeat, hindering the stability of his government.

Brazil: Bolsonaro’s conviction triggers political upheaval and mass mobilization

On 11 September, Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court sentenced former President Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for orchestrating an attempted coup on 8 January 2023.⁴ Seven members of Bolsonaro’s inner circle were also sentenced to between 16 and 26 years in the same case. The trial sparked mobilizations by both Bolsonaro’s supporters and detractors. Demonstrations in September increased by around a third compared to the previous month. ACLED records 105 demonstrations related to Bolsonaro’s trial and his political maneuvering in congress. 

While the majority of demonstrations were in opposition to Bolsonaro, his supporters held at least 29 protests demanding amnesty for those involved in the attempted coup. This fight to subvert the ruling was also taken up in the Chamber of Deputies, where Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party fast-tracked an amnesty law bill and a constitutional amendment to shield deputies and senators from criminal prosecution.⁵ 

But this only strengthened anti-Bolsonaro protests. On 21 September, left-leaning parties and social movements took to the streets in all 27 state capitals.⁶ Besides opposing the amnesty proposal, protesters called to defend Brazilian sovereignty against US President Donald Trump’s attempts to influence the result of the trial by imposing a 50% trade tariff and individual sanctions on high-level judiciary officials.⁷ The proposal was eventually rejected by the Federal Senate's Constitution and Justice Committee on 24 September.⁸ Despite the historic ruling, polarization around Bolsonaro and the events of 8 January 2023 still runs high in Brazil and could fuel tensions ahead of the 2026 elections.

Colombia: The US decertifies Colombia in the drug war but retains its anti-narcotics assistance

For the first time since 1997, on 15 September, the United States government included Colombia in the list of countries that have failed to cooperate in the war against drugs, although with a waiver that maintains the counter-narcotics assistance in place. The US pointed to record-high levels in coca crops and cocaine production under President Gustavo Petro’s term and his peace negotiations with armed groups as key factors behind the determination.⁹ Petro qualified the decision as being political and announced that Colombia would stop buying weapons from the US.¹⁰ Tensions further increased after Petro joined a pro-Palestine protest in New York on 26 September, at the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, urging US soldiers to disobey orders. This prompted the Trump administration to revoke his visa.¹¹ 

The push from the US government and the escalation of violence by armed groups have put Petro at a crossroads between stepping up the military offensive against them and continuing peace talks. Compared to 517 clashes in the whole of 2024, ACLED records 665 clashes between state forces and non-state armed groups so far in 2025, the highest number in a given year since ACLED started covering the country in 2018. In recent weeks, Petro has called for the designation of armed groups as terrorists and even suggested resuming aerial fumigation to eradicate illicit crops.¹² Meanwhile, the government has kicked off the first round of peace talks with the Gulf Clan, one of Colombia’s largest criminal organizations, in Qatar.¹³ These developments highlight the challenges that Petro faces in seeking to achieve positive security outcomes while trying to deliver on his Total Peace policy with less than a year left in office.

Ecuador: Protests against the removal of a fuel subsidy turn deadly

On 12 September, President Daniel Noboa issued a decree that ended a fuel subsidy, sparking a wave of unrest led by the National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), farmers, and transporters.¹⁴ ACLED records 28 demonstrations related to the government’s decision in September, scattered around 13 provinces, most notably Imbabura. As soon as CONAIE announced a national strike on 18 September, Noboa declared a curfew in five provinces and declared a state of emergency in eight, limiting the right to freedom of assembly.¹⁵ Noboa has also referred to demonstrators as terrorists and criminals and has stated that he will not compromise.¹⁶ Security forces have arrested around 100 people.¹⁷

While most demonstrations were peaceful, they often involved roadblocks and sometimes turned violent. Tensions, though, have increased after an Indigenous man was killed with live ammunition on 28 September in a clash between military forces and demonstrators after the latter attacked a convoy led by Noboa in Cotacachi. According to authorities, 12 soldiers were injured and 17 were being held by demonstrators.¹⁸ CONAIE decried the killing and called for citizens to continue demonstrating.¹⁹ For its part, the government has shown little willingness to make any concessions. Both sides’ refusal to compromise will likely continue to fuel tensions in the coming weeks.

Haiti: The Viv Ansanm alliance expands its actions in northern areas, while deadly violence resumes in the Ouest department

In September, members of the Viv Ansanm alliance expanded their operations along National Road 1, a key route for controlling tolls and moving ammunition between the capital and the north. They launched attacks in communities in the Ouest, Artibonite, and Nord-Ouest departments.²⁰ On 11 September, in Labodrie, Ouest, members of the Viv Ansanm gang killed at least 50 people in retaliation for the killing of one of their leaders during a clash between police and members of a self-defense group a few days before. The Kokorat San Ras gang, which is also part of Viv Ansanm, kidnapped several residents and killed a man on 16 September in Bassin-Bleu community in Nord-Ouest, a department mostly spared from gang violence in recent years, and then carried out three separate attacks between 20 and 22 September in rural communities of L’Estère commune in the north of Artibonite. 

Coinciding with Viv Ansanm’s expansion, gang attacks and anti-gang operations contributed to around a 50% increase in reported fatalities countrywide in September, compared to the previous month. Anti-gang efforts continued in the capital. Authorities launched at least eight drone strikes in gang-controlled areas that resulted in around 30 deaths, including eight children. Local human rights organizations have raised concerns about the lack of transparency regarding responsibility for the drone strikes. The government has not made the rules of engagement public, nor has it provided detailed accounts of civilian casualties or confirmed who is operating the drones. It has only confirmed that they are being used as part of a task force created a few months ago with the support of the private security company Vectus Global.²¹ 

Meanwhile, the future of international security cooperation with Haiti remains unclear. On 30 September, the UN Security Council approved the US proposal to create a new “suppression” force of 5,500 officers to replace the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission, but this will also rely on voluntary contributions from UN members.²² 

Venezuela: Tensions escalate as US drone strikes target alleged criminal groups in the Caribbean

Between 2 and 19 September, US forces carried out at least three strikes against vessels off the Venezuelan coast, killing 17 people. US officials justified the strikes as being part of their fight against drug trafficking. US President Donal Trump has accused the Venezuelan government of enabling trafficking networks and failing to curb drug flows.²³ These actions signal a strategic shift toward a counter-terrorism approach to organized crime, following the US designation of 13 Latin American and Caribbean criminal groups as “foreign terrorist organizations” in February. However, the UN and human rights experts raised concerns that similar actions could spread elsewhere and condemned the strikes as extrajudicial killings.²⁴ 

President Nicolás Maduro denounced the attacks, warning they reflect US attempts to either spur regime change or secure access to Venezuelan resources.²⁵ In response, the Venezuelan government announced the mobilization of armed forces and pro-government militias and the deployment of military assets near La Orchila Island.²⁶ Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López also issued a warning to neighboring Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, which have supported the strikes, saying Caracas would retaliate if either country launched an attack against Venezuela from their territories.²⁷ Maduro has indicated a willingness to engage in dialogue with Washington, but also announced he would impose a state of emergency if the US attacks.²⁸ US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has suggested additional strikes are likely to come, further raising the risk of escalation in the coming months.²⁹