Security Belt Forces

The Security Belt Forces (SBF) are paramilitary units that carry out counter-terrorism and law enforcement activities in southern Yemen. Founded in 2016, they are trained, supplied, and financed by the United Arab Emirates. While formally placed under the authority of the Ministry of Interior, they are reported to respond to the operational command of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). They are led by Brigadier Muhsin al-Wali and consist of approximately 15,000 fighters organized in four territorial units: Abyan, al-Dali, Lahij, and Aden.

SBF Leadership

The leadership of the SBF reflects the fragmentation of the field aligned with the UAE and the STC in Yemen, and the hybrid command-and-control structure. Commanders in Aden and Lahij – as of January 2024, Brigadier General Jalal al-Rubai and Husayn al-Saidi – are affiliated with the clique of Aydarus al-Zubaydi – the president of the STC and commander of the Southern Forces. Commanders in al-Dali and Abyan – Ahmad al-Qubba and Haydara Muhammad Hussayn Bafaqih, respectively¹ – are instead reported to be more aligned with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). The general commander of the SBF, Brigadier General Muhsin al-Wali, is instead associated with a clique of leaders from al-Yafi which competes with Zubaydi.

Historical background

The UAE gradually began establishing the SBF in March 2016.² Counter-terrorism units were initially formed in Aden, where the UAE had established a military camp in al-Burayqa as early as July 2015. Alongside their primary counter-terrorism mission, these units were also tasked with fighting crime.³ Additional SBF forces were established in Lahij, in June 2016, and Abyan, in August 2016, with approximately 2,500 fighters focused on countering al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) activity. However, SBF presence remained limited in al-Dali, with the governorate being mostly secured by local militias.⁴

During this early phase, the SBF counted around 15,000 fighters⁵ and officially answered to the Ministry of Interior of the IRG. Erstwhile President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi decreed the establishment of SBF brigades under the Support and Reinforcement Brigades between April⁶ and May⁷ 2016. Yet, in practice, the SBF operated under Abu Dhabi’s command and were being trained, supplied, and financially supported by the UAE.

This hybrid command-and-control persisted after the establishment of the STC, in May 2017.⁸ In fact, the UAE subordinated the SBF brigades to the operational control of STC-aligned commanders, with STC fighters publicly manifesting their support for the secession of the south.⁹ In 2017, the SBF intensified counter-terrorism operations in Abyan and Lahij, while sporadic infighting with the IRG forces emerged in Aden. In January 2018, when political tensions between the STC and the IRG erupted, the SBF sided with the former and played a crucial role in the battle of Aden.

On 1 August 2019, a Houthi missile struck a military parade in Aden, resulting in at least 40 fatalities including the SBF commander Abu Yamama al-Yafii.¹⁰ The STC blamed the IRG for enabling the attack, sparking heavy clashes with military units in Aden and in the neighboring Abyan and Shabwa governorates. Despite the STC signing the Riyadh Agreement – a Saudi-brokered deal mandating a political and military overhaul – clashes between the SBF and IRG forces continued on high levels until December 2020, when President Hadi announced the establishment of a new cabinet.

In November 2021, STC President Zubaydi decreed the integration of the SBF under the IRG’s Ministry of Interior, assigning the forces “police and security missions”¹¹ and separating them from the Support and Reinforcement Brigades. Concomitantly, he appointed Brigadier Muhsin al-Wali as commander of the SBF, and Brigadier Mukhtar al-Nubi as his deputy.

The establishment of the Presidential Leadership Council preluded further integration of the STC-backed units into the IRG’s command-and-control structure. However, recent developments also point to an expansion of the SBF’s area of influence. In August 2022, pro-STC forces, including the SBF, redeployed to Abyan spearheading several offensives against AQAP. On 10 August 2023, during Operation Swords of Haws in the Mudiya district, AQAP elements killed the recently appointed commander of the SBF in Abyan, Abdullatif al-Sayyid, who was replaced by Haydara Muhammad Bafaqih on 13  August 2023. Since September 2023, AQAP activity has consistently decreased across Abyan and Shabwa, notwithstanding a few notable high-profile attacks.

• 2016
  • Mar. | The SBF is established
• 2018
  • Jan. | Battle of Aden
• 2019
  • Aug. | Houthi missile strike kills SBF commander Abu Yamama al-Yafii
• 2021
  • Nov. | STC President Zubaydi decrees the integration of the SBF in the Ministry of Interior
• 2022
  • Aug. | STC launches Operation Arrows of the East in Abyan against AQAP
• 2023
  • 6 Aug. | STC launches Operation Swords of Haws in Abyan’s Mudiya district against AQAP
  • 10 Aug. | AQAP elements kill Abdullatif al-Sayyid, commander of the SBF in Abyan, during a counter-terrorism operation in Mudiya district
  • 13 Aug. | Haydara Muhammad Hussayn Bafaqih is appointed commander of the SBF in Abyan
  • 4 Oct. | An AQAP-planted roadside IED explosion kills the SBF’s Shuqra sector commander, Capt. Salim Salan