Asia-Pacific Overview: August 2025

Cambodia - Thailand: The resurgence of the border conflict results in deadly clashes

A long-simmering Thailand-Cambodia border dispute erupted in late July, leading to armed clashes, civilian casualties, and the imposition of emergency measures along the frontier. Tensions resurfaced in May with the first direct confrontation between the two countries since 2014, leading to the death of a Cambodian soldier, a diplomatic fallout, and the suspension of Thailand’s prime minister from office. 

Hostilities intensified again on 23 July when five Thai soldiers were injured by a landmine. Thailand authorities accused the Cambodian army of planting the device — an allegation that was met with strong denials.¹ The situation further deteriorated on 24 July, with heavy fighting near the contested Preah Vihear temple and along the border. Over the next four days, at least 35 people were reportedly killed on both sides in the deadliest confrontation between Thailand and Cambodia since the 2011 clashes near the same historic site. 

Skirmishes continued on 28 July in Phu Makua and other areas surrounding the temple complex, but a ceasefire agreement was brokered later that day by ASEAN Chair and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim with support from US President Donald Trump.² The truce officially came into effect at midnight on 28 July, but within 24 hours, Thai authorities accused Cambodia of violating the agreement, citing artillery fire and drone incursions.³ Cambodian officials rejected the allegations, countering that Thai forces had detained 20 Cambodian soldiers a few hours after the ceasefire, and killed another in custody.⁴ While the still shaky ceasefire remains in place and both sides claim to be holding their positions without further movement, mistrust persists, and nationalist sentiment has risen in both countries.⁵ Negotiations are now ongoing under the ceasefire terms, but do not seem to address the territorial disputes that set the conditions for and continue to fuel the recurring conflict on the border.

Myanmar: Military intensifies offensives, recapturing Nawnghkio and Thabeikkyin

The Myanmar military recaptured two strategic towns in Mandalay region and northern Shan state previously held by resistance forces in July, intensifying threats to surrounding areas and endangering civilian lives. On 16 July, the military regained control of Nawnghkio in northern Shan state from the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) after five months of sustained offensives. This marks the first major town reclaimed by the military through force since the resistance forces’ Operation 1027 began in late 2023.

In the Mandalay region, junta forces retook the riverside Thabeikkyin town on 23 July from the People’s Defense Forces (PDF). The military used overwhelming firepower from the land, air, and river, deploying reinforcements from six navy vessels at a nearby riverbank.⁶ On 19 July, the Mandalay PDF launched attacks on the flotilla transporting weapons and reinforcements in Singu and Thabeikkyin townships that are both situated along the Irrawaddy river, claiming to have sunk one vessel and damaged two others.⁷ Despite these efforts, the military re-established control over Thabeikkyin a few days later. 

With Nawnghkio to the south and Thabeikkyin to the west now under junta control, Mogoke is increasingly vulnerable to attack, as this town in the Mandalay region is strategically important to control and is likely the military’s next target.​⁸ ACLED records the highest monthly total of armed clashes in Mandalay since August 2024, with 45 events resulting in 176 reported fatalities. 

Pakistan: Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan ramps up drone strikes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province

In July, Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and affiliated groups escalated their use of commercial quadcopters loaded with IEDs and mortar attacks against security forces in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. This is a strategic move by the TTP to exploit gaps in local counter-drone capabilities.⁹ ACLED records at least 10 such drone strikes by militants in July, a significant increase from only two reportedly carried out by the TTP in the first half of 2025. Amid continued military pressure, militants have turned to drones as a low-risk, cost-effective tactic, particularly in military strongholds like Bannu district, where most of July’s strikes occurred. Despite being aimed at security forces, the strikes killed five civilians in July.

The rise in reported militant drone activity parallels the growing use of drones by security forces as part of their anti-militancy operations. In 2025 so far, ACLED records more than 26 drone strikes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, reportedly carried out by both the military and militant groups. This is already the highest recorded use of drone strikes internally within Pakistan since ACLED’s coverage began in 2018. The TTP and the military have both denied responsibility for various drone strikes, while restrictions on media access have made independent verification of details difficult.¹⁰ 

The resulting civilian casualties have fueled local discontent. In July, ACLED records at least 10 demonstrations across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province condemning military operations and civilian casualties caused by quadcopter strikes and shelling. In one such protest in the Tirah Valley on 27 July, military forces fired on and killed seven people who were demonstrating against the killing of a child by a drone strike the previous day. The incident underscores how the expanded use of quadcopters by both militants and security forces is deepening civilian mistrust in the government and escalating the threat for the civilian population in the region.¹¹

Papua New Guinea: ​​Polling disruptions and violence signal enduring risks to the country’s electoral process

Disruptions during recent by-elections and the delayed rollout of local-level government (LLG) polls highlight persistent logistical and security challenges in Papua New Guinea. Polling for by-elections in Porgera-Paiela (Enga), Aitape-Lumi (Sandaun), and Usino Bundi (Madang) districts and the long-delayed Motu-Koita Assembly elections in the National Capital District began on 12 July and ran through to 1 August.¹² These elections — which were held to fill vacancies resulting from deaths, unresolved electoral petitions, election-related disruptions, and administrative delays¹³ —  saw multiple outbreaks of violence.

In Enga province, tensions escalated during the Porgera-Paiela by-election after eight ballot boxes were hijacked by candidate supporters.¹⁴ In retaliation, supporters of a rival candidate damaged two bridges at the Mulitaka landslide zone on 18 July, cutting off access between the Porgera Valley and the gold mine and disrupting business and transport. Although the ballot boxes were later recovered, they were believed to have been tampered with and were excluded from counting.¹⁵ A few days later, in Sandaun province, during polling in Pou village for the Aitape-Lumi by-election, 11 individuals attacked a police officer and destroyed a ballot box.¹⁶ 

Ballot theft, property destruction, attacks on polling officials, and clashes over vote counting and campaigning are prevalent in both local and national elections in Papua New Guinea. While polling violence tends to be more intense in Highlands provinces such as Enga, it is not isolated to the region. Recent incidents have been driven in part by disputes among candidates and their supporters. These patterns mirror the supplementary elections that followed the 2022 national elections in Kompiam and Wabag, where violence erupted, ballot boxes were destroyed, and a clash over a counting venue resulted in the deaths of five people. 

Meanwhile, the Electoral Commission postponed LLG elections initially scheduled for 12 July to 27 September, citing administrative delays and procurement issues.¹⁷ The delays, alongside polling violence, raise concerns about the government’s ability to prevent conflict and hold peaceful elections.

Philippines: Continued rido violence involving the MILF highlights risks for the upcoming BARMM election

Members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were involved in multiple high-profile rido-related killings in Mindanao in July. This highlights the fragile security situation in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) as its residents head toward the region’s first-ever parliamentary elections in October. Two separate incidents resulted in two MILF commanders being killed in violence ostensibly related to rido  — traditional clan blood feuds in Muslim Moro society. On 24 July, a MILF commander belonging to the Mascud clan was shot dead by members of an unspecified Moro clan in Midsayap town, Cotabato, Soccsksargen. The slain commander’s relatives, some of whom were also injured, blamed the attack on a long-standing rido. Meanwhile, on 21 July, another MILF commander, who was also a militia leader for the Utap clan, was shot dead by unidentified assailants in Rajah Buayan town, Maguindanao del Sur, BARMM. While the exact motive for this attack was unclear, the Utap clan had just signed a peace agreement with the Utto clan on 10 July.

ACLED earlier flagged the continued threat of rido to the Mindanao peace process, especially given the continuing entanglement of MILF members in rido violence. With electoral competition often serving as a pretext for rido violence, including for MILF-linked clans, such violence looms as a threat to an election in which the MILF itself is set to play a primary role — both as participant and as the transitional regional government. The upcoming election, scheduled for 13 October, is meant to culminate the peace agreement signed between the MILF and the government in 2014. The MILF’s political party, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, will contest the election and aim to preserve its current majority in the transitional parliament.¹⁸ The MILF has been leading BARMM’s transitional institutions since the autonomous region’s creation in 2019, following a plebiscite held in accordance with the 2014 peace agreement.¹⁹

Correction: The paragraph on Mandalay region in the Myanmar section says that the "Mandalay PDF" controlled Thabeikkyin before the junta retook the township. Multiple PDFs controlled Thabeikkyin township, not just the Mandalay PDF.