Asia-Pacific Overview: October 2025
Rohingya militants became increasingly active in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine state, anti-government demonstrations turned deadly in Nepal, and mass rallies and violent demonstrations against corruption broke out in the Philippines this past month
Myanmar: Rohingya militants become increasingly active in northern Rakhine state
In September, Rohingya militant activities reached a monthly high for 2025 in Rakhine state, with ACLED recording 11 events. These include attacks targeting civilians and the United League for Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), which controls the entire Maungdaw district border with Bangladesh. Operating primarily from the Bangladeshi side of the border, Rohingya militants frequently crossed into Myanmar for their attacks. Observers expected a surge in violence following reports that the Myanmar military has fueled Rohingya militant agitation throughout the year in the increasingly desperate Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh.1
Rohingya militants carried out several attacks on the ULA/AA, including on 16 September, when the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) launched coordinated attacks on ULA/AA’s Maungdaw border camps in Inn Chaung and Kyauk Lone villages. The clashes continued until 27 September, when the ULA/AA forced ARSA militants to retreat into Bangladesh. During the clashes, the ULA/AA reportedly inflicted hundreds of casualties on the militants, and the ARSA killed at least five civilians.2 The September attacks followed a series of ambushes by Rohingya militants against ULA/AA forces in August. Overall, August and September alone account for around half of all Rohingya militant activity recorded by ACLED in 2025.
Four Rohingya armed groups — including ARSA — are working together in a loose alliance, aiming to seize control of Buthidaung, Maungdaw, and Rathedaung from the ULA/AA — three townships with previously high Rohingya populations.3 In addition to the alleged recent links with the Myanmar military, the ULA/AA claims these groups receive support from border authorities in Bangladesh, and that their camps are located in close proximity to Bangladesh Border Guard (BGB) outposts.4 The BGB, for its part, accuses the ULA/AA of involvement in drug trafficking.5 As these relations deteriorate, informal border trade has come to a complete halt. Civilians remaining in Maungdaw continue to suffer violence and intense scrutiny from both the ULA/AA and Rohingya militants.
Nepal: Anti-government demonstrations turn deadly and lead to a political fallout
Anti-corruption demonstrations, spearheaded by Gen-Z activists, erupted across Nepal on 8 September, swiftly toppling Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli’s administration, defying harsh police repression. While the government's decision to ban social media platforms was the immediate trigger, the demonstrations reflected deeper frustrations among Nepal’s youth over corruption, high unemployment, and widening social inequality.6
The protest movement quickly escalated into violence as police deployed deadly force. In Kathmandu and Itahari cities, police fired live, high-velocity ammunition, reportedly killing dozens of demonstrators. The use of force inflamed public anger, leading to widespread vandalism and arson. Government buildings and politicians’ residences were targeted, with the capital city witnessing the most intense violence. Protesters set fire to Parliament and the Supreme Court, while three policemen were reportedly lynched by mobs.7 In two days, ACLED records over 120 demonstrations across all seven provinces of the country, around 70% of which involved violence. Over the course of unrest, the total death toll exceeded 60, marking the deadliest demonstrations since ACLED began recording data on Nepal in 2010.
Under mounting pressure, Oli reversed the social media ban the same night it was announced and resigned the next day, 9 September. On 12 September, former Supreme Court Chief Justice Sushila Karki, favored by the youth for her anti-corruption stance, was appointed as the interim prime minister.8 The same day, the president dissolved Parliament and called for new elections on 5 March next year.
The protest movement grew from the Nepalese Gen Z #nepobabies online movement, which has exposed corruption among political leaders and their families and highlighted economic inequalities. They followed large pro-monarchy demonstrations in Kathmandu earlier this year, when thousands rallied for the restoration of the Hindu monarchy, reflecting widespread frustration over entrenched corruption and economic instability.9 Another wave of protests may emerge if the interim government fails to deliver a credible path toward stable governance.10
Pakistan: Violence in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province becomes increasingly lethal
Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) group militants carried out deadly attacks against security forces in September, prompting retaliatory military operations in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
The military’s counterterrorism campaign, launched in response to high-fatality TTP and HGB attacks in the Badar valley and Bannu city, killed at least 30 militants. Ground forces are suspected to have received aerial support in some instances, though this has not been officially confirmed.11 On 22 September, military personnel raided a compound used by TTP militants in the Tirah valley. Local politicians again alleged that the military deployed aerial strikes, which triggered explosions, reportedly killing at least 10 civilians alongside 14 militants. No official statement on the incident has been issued, while lawmakers and the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan have called for an investigation.
Fatalities from violence between militants and security forces more than doubled in September compared to the month prior, even as the overall level of such violence decreased. Amid the increased lethality of these operations, the military’s use of airstrikes, as alleged by locals, has come under increasing scrutiny for its heightened risk of civilian casualties. Seemingly cognizant of potential backlash, neither the military nor the national government has officially commented on the use of airstrikes. However, provincial legislators have already distanced themselves, calling the Tirah incident an “attack on unarmed civilians.”12 This approach is likely to further intensify opposition to military operations, which are already unpopular among locals, having previously resulted in massive displacements.13
Papua New Guinea: Ongoing clashes in Wapenamanda prompt court action
Retaliatory attacks between Yangakuni and Yakuman tribesmen once again shattered an informal truce and triggered court intervention in the Wapenamanda district of Enga province. On 6 and 7 September, Yangakuni tribesmen killed a man from the Yakuman tribe, injured several others, and burned homes near the Yakuman land boundary.
These attacks form part of an escalating cycle of violence that began on 30 August, when two Yakuman men were killed in what appeared to be retaliation for an assassination attempt on Wapenamanda Member of Parliament and Transport Minister Miki Kaeok, a Yangakuni tribesman, two weeks earlier. In an attempt to prevent further retaliation, Yakuman leaders declared a unilateral truce on 29 August, contingent upon mutual respect for tribal boundaries and a commitment to refrain from encroachment.14 However, the subsequent attacks by Yangakuni tribesmen swiftly undermined any attempt at a truce, exposing the fragility of informal peace deals in Enga province.
The violence has had a broad impact on critical infrastructure in the region, disrupting education, obstructing road access, and halting court functions. In response, the National Court in Wabag issued interim orders on 26 September, banning roadblocks, weapons, and further hostilities.15 The court warned that any breaches would result in arrests for contempt of court and directed both tribes to sign a court-backed ceasefire.
Philippines: Mass rallies and violent demonstrations mark day of outrage against corruption
Mounting public anger over large-scale corruption in government projects culminated in massive demonstrations on 21 September. The two largest demonstrations took place at Luneta Park in Manila and along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, drawing at least 100,000 participants.16
While most protests remained peaceful, the Manila march escalated into a riot. Masked youths set a trailer truck ablaze and threw rocks and bottles at police and SWAT officers, who responded with water cannons, tear gas, batons, and long-range acoustic devices. The riot left at least two dead — a bystander struck by a stray bullet and a 15-year-old protester who was fatally stabbed by a watch repairman defending his property.17 At least 216 people, including 91 minors, were arrested,18 while 129 police officers and 76 civilians were reportedly injured.19
On EDSA, a brawl broke out between supporters of former President Rodrigo Duterte and anti-Duterte demonstrators, amid the latter’s chants of “No difference between Marcos and Duterte!”20 Pro-Duterte groups also held parallel anti-corruption rallies nationwide, directing blame at President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and calling on him to resign.21
The protests came after several top politicians, including prominent allies of the quarreling Marcos and Duterte families, were implicated in recent Senate inquiries on substandard and anomalous flood control and other infrastructure projects.22 Public anger has been building since deadly floods ravaged the country in July. In response, Marcos Jr. vowed a crackdown on irregularities in his State of the Nation Address later that month.23 The timing of the protests also held symbolic weight, coinciding with the 53rd anniversary of the declaration of martial law by the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. The mobilizations were part of more than a four-times increase in protests in September compared to the previous month.
Footnotes
- 1
International Crisis Group, “Bangladesh/Myanmar: The Dangers of a Rohingya Insurgency,” 18 June 2025
- 2
Naung Min Thu, “Hundreds of Militants Die in AA’s Counteroffensive at Rakhine-Bangladesh border,” Narinjara, 24 September 2025 (Burmese); Khaing Lu Hla, “Corpses of five civilians killed by militants found,” 29 September 2025 (Burmese)
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Khaing Lu Hla, “BGB claims AA’s statement is a propaganda,” Narinjara, 30 September 2025 (Burmese)
- 6
Kapil Komireddi, “Nepal’s Violent Gen Z Uprising,” New Yorker, 22 September 2025
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France24, “Nepal ex-chief justice Karki becomes next PM after protests,” 12 September 2025
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Post-Courier, “Tribe violates Wapenamanda peace accord,” 8 September 2025
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Post-Courier, “Another ceasefire expected in Wapenamanda this week,” 24 September 2025, print newspaper
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Iya Gozum, “Outrage in Manila: What happened in the September 21 riots,” Rappler, 22 September 2025
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ABS-CBN News, “Duterte supporters hold anti-corruption protest in Liwasang Bonifacio,” 21 September 2025; Jhunnex Napallacan, “Pro-Duterte rallyists occupy Cebu City’s park ahead of Trillion Peso March,” INQUIRER.net, 21 September 2025
- 22
Lian Buan, “In witness bid, Discayas link politicians, engineers to kickbacks,” Rappler, 8 September 2025; Jose Rodel Clapano, “Jinggoy, Villanueva tagged in DPWH kickback scheme,” Philippine Star, 10 September 2025; Charie Abarca, “Senate subpoenas 5 contractors, 3 DPWH execs in flood control probe,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, 4 September 2025
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